Anything short of [the IRA's] total annihilation by the Crown forces was going to leave [the IRA] in a position of advantage. For the government to negotiate with them at all was to undermine much of the attitude it had adopted towards them throughout, to recognize at least some substance in what they stood for and acknowledge them as representatives of the Irish nation. To this extent, though Sir Hamar Greenwood might talk manfully as late as May 1921 about fighting on 'until the last revolver had been plucked from the hand of the last assassin', the government were engaged in a losing battle...
Militarily, the British Army, by a series of large sweeps and the use of flexible columns of their own, were proving increasingly troublesome to the IRA's flying columns, who were also short of arms and ammunition... The essential truth of the time, militarily, is that thought the IRA did not have the same control of parts of Ireland they had had in the middle of 1920, they were now more experienced and better organized, and to have beaten them would have required a far greater military effort than any yet seen in Ireland.
Subsequent experience of regular forces with guerrilla movements enjoying support from their own people - in Palestine, Cyprus, and Algeria - suggests that a military victory is never possible in such circumstances. Once such guerrillas have been able to establish themselves effectively at all there can only be a political solution. British public opinion in 1921, deeply disturbed about the violence in Ireland and the apparently inevitable lawlessness of Crown forces in the prevailing conditions, would have been most reluctant to see further repression on the inevitably gigantic scale required. In this sense the IRA won a victory by forcing political negotiation.
Although all guerrilla war situations differ in some way or another, the unifying characteristic between the Irish case and the "war on terror" is "guerrilla movements enjoying support from their own people." The support of the people doesn't have to have existed from the beginning of the movement - the 1916 Easter Rising was extremely unpopular with the Irish people to the extent that the arrested participants were booed by crowds as they boarded ships for transport to England. What began to turn Irish public opinion was the subsequent executions of the leaders of the rising, who were turned into martyrs in the Irish tradition. It created a clear division between Irish and British. The Irish saw the situation as the British executing Irishmen instead of the government executing rebels.
Even in light of the executions, successive IRA activities, such as the murders of Royal Irish Constabulary officers, British government officials and Irish people suspected as "spies" for the British government, were not met with acceptance - in fact, they were harshly rebuked, especially by the Catholic Church. It was only when the RIC officers and Auxiliaries began committing acts of reprisal on the common people that Irish public opinion turned forever towards the Nationalist cause. The IRA manipulated the people into compliance, but that was not the important point. What was important to the Irish was that Irish people were being killed by representatives of the British government. The mythology that the IRA clung to, of the Irish physically suffering under the arms of the British, became reality - there was finally a war between the Irish and the British.
Now we must pose the question: Why has al Qaeda attacked the United States?
1. They want to kill all Americans;
2. They want the US out of the Middle East, specifically Saudi Arabia and Israel, and they thought that attacking the US would make us pull out;
3. They want the US out of the Middle East, ultimately, but they know that they won't be able to accomplish this without the popular support of the people of the Middle East; thus, they hoped for reprisals from the US which they could use as a rally cry to their cause.
My money is on 3. In a video broadcast on al Jazeera in December 2001, Bin Laden is clearly using recent US bombing campaigns as a rally cry to his cause:
It has become clear that the West in general and America in particular have an unspeakable hatred for Islam. Those who lived under continuous US raids for the past months are aware of it. How many villages have been destroyed and how many millions have been pushed out in the freezing cold? These men, women and children who have been damned and now live under tents in Pakistan, have committed no sin. They are innocent. But on a mere suspicion, the United States has launched this fierce campaign... After they (the Americans), for no reason, bombed entire villages to scare the inhabitants, the defense secretary said it was the United States' right to exterminate the peoples since they are Muslim and since they are not American.While Bin Laden has issued fatwas calling for the killing of American civilians, nowhere is it stated that the ultimate goal of the movement is to kill all Americans; rather, the killing of Americans is a means to an end as well as a cleaver in the distinction between Muslims and Americans - ALL Americans are enemies of ALL Muslims. This, again, is a rally cry to his cause.
But a rally cry to what? In February 1998, Bin Laden and al Zawahiri issued a fatwa which detailed a few grievances: US troops in Saudi Arabia, coercion of leaders of government in the Middle East, and the support of the Israeli state. These are valid grievances, though I do believe that the leaders who are propped up by the United States do not serve totally unwillingly, for they know that without US support they would not be in power.
This is part of the problem. While the IRA represented a nation insofar as they were backed by elected officials, al Qaeda does not represent a specific nation nor a specific people, although they wish to represent all Muslim people. They know that this is not the case - that average people would rather live their lives in peace than to fight and be subject to abuse for a cause which is quite foreign from their everyday existence. That is why they had to make al Qaeda's cause an issue in the everyday existence of the average Middle Easterner; that is why they have provoked the United States into open war. They, like the IRA, are manipulating their people into a struggle they would otherwise not get involved in.
The leaders of our government have been perpetuating the notion that there is no precedent for the terrorist activities of Islamic extremists but we have seen that this is simply not the case. There may not be perfect matches between current events and historic - this is a universal truth - but there are similar cases available to use as reference points for current policy. Thus, given the relevant historical case studies for our current situation in the Middle East, specifically the case of Ireland, here are the possible logical conclusions we may draw concerning the mentality of our leaders:
1. The leaders in government are not aware of these historical cases;
2. The leaders in government are aware of these historical cases but have chosen to ignore them;
3. The leaders in government are aware of these historical cases and have chosen their policy with these lessons in mind.
Many people would like to believe that 1 is the case either to feel superior to their leaders or to protect themselves from the alternative, but I believe that is simply ridiculous. 2 is tempting, but I believe that this case can only be adopted if 3 can be shown invalid, so let's try to reason 3 to absurdity:
History tells us that when a group with guerrilla movements has the cooperation of the civilians in a location, one must either kill or disarm all of the guerrillas or come to a political solution. A political solution is ruled impossible; thus, every guerrilla must be killed or disarmed. Killing or disarming every guerrilla will take a tremendous amount of troops, time and resources, but as time goes on the guerrillas become more experienced and more guerrillas are imported or made by the cause, thus making it nearly impossible to clean the country out. If it is impossible to kill or disarm all of the guerrillas and the only solution is to kill or disarm all of the guerrillas, then we have a perpetual war.
Unfortunately, this is a valid argument, though perhaps it gives the government too much credit. Why would the United States want to get involved in a perpetual war in Iraq or Afghanistan?
Let's return to the Irish situation. The British didn't want a perpetual war; they wanted the Irish to acquiesce to their authority. To the British, preserving the empire was the top priority, for that meant control over the trade and resources of that land and places to house their vast military operation.
The object in the US-Iraq situation is also control - over resources, most notably Iraq's oil reserves, and over the area, a strategic military position in the center of the politically volatile Middle East. The difference between this and the Irish case is that the US has no claim whatsoever to Iraq, which is a sovereign nation. Thus, if there were some sort of peace in Iraq, the US would be forced to relinquish control of it to its people. Since there is strife, the US is able to maintain military and administrative control. A perpetual war allows the United States to continue its presence in Iraq until a political agreement is reached, it is forced out by insurgents or forced by world or domestic public opinion to abandon its enterprise. As a result, the US has to secure that none of these situations come to fruition before the government decides that it is no longer in need of Iraq. The current administration will never acknowledge the terrorist parties as political, nevertheless negotiate with them. This in and of itself would be considered, they would claim, a victory for the terrorists and a major setback for the United States. Additionally, while the US doesn't actually have the resources to continue this war, it does seem willing to mortgage the nation to continue the fight for as long as it deems necessary. Finally, the propaganda machine has been working overtime to quell negative public opinion with pearls such as, "they attacked us because they hate our freedoms." The same argument can be run on Afghanistan.
Thus, each side is manipulating its people into compliance. But where does it end? The lessons of history have shown us that the only solution is a political one. But in the case of al Qaeda, how does the United States negotiate with a group that does not represent a clear political body? And in the case of so-called "terrorist" groups in Iraq and Afghanistan, how do we combat the doctrine "thou shalt not negotiate with terrorists"? It is apparent that the continued use of military force will only rally more Muslims to the insurgents' cause; but, perhaps, that is precisely what U.S. policymakers want.